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Abstract
This paper proposes a mandatory social security contribution regime in order to adjust the 
consumption and retirement age of quasi-hyperbolic discounters to the optimal level in the 
long-run perspective, which is under exponential discounting. Within this mandatory pension 
contribution regime, this paper ascertains that the behavior of some generations can be adjusted 
to the optimal level while other generations cannot have both consumption and retirement 
age adjusted to the optimal level. With behavior adjusted to the optimal level, the adjusted 
generations’ welfare is improved. However, the un-adjusted generations’ welfare is deteriorated.
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1. Introduction
Quasi-hyperbolic discounters, with strong present bias, tend to consume at a higher level than the 
exponential discounters do, which is demonstrated by theoretical studies. And in order to support 
themselves after they stop working, quasi-hyperbolic discounters have to work for a longer time than 
exponential discounters. Since exponential discounters’ preference is time-consistent, their decisions 
of consumption level and retirement age are regarded as the optimal outcome in the long-run 
perspective. Therefore, compared with exponential discounters, the present bias causes deviations of 
consumption level and retirement age of quasi-hyperbolic discounters from exponential discounters.
On the other hand, social security system, particularly pension system, reallocates consumption 
level across a consumer’s life and is regarded as one of commitment devices to help individuals 
whose time preference is inconsistent commit their future behavior. It is of great interest to ask how a 
mandatory social security regime adjusts quasi-hyperbolic discounters’ behavior which is considered 
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to be irrational in the long-run perspective. This paper investigates that whether social security system 
adjusts consumption level or retirement age of quasi-hyperbolic discounters, and to what extent it can 
adjust them.
Blake (2004) shows that pension promotes greater saving and encourages earlier retirement. 
Cremer et al. (2009) study the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in 
productivity and in their degree of myopia and suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals 
increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving by numerical examples. Cremer and 
Pestieau (2011) explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects pension design 
when individuals differ also in productivity.
The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model is widely applied to study people’s behavior of saving 
for retirement, for its good approximation to hyperbolic discounting’s accurate description of time-
inconsistent impatience – discounting the near future much more heavily than the distant future for 
the same length of time period, which is inspired by experimental research and common intuitions. 1 
The behavior in pension system under hyperbolic discounting (or quasi-hyperbolic discounting) has 
been included in theoretical studies. Schwarz and Sheshinski (2007) examine the effects of hyperbolic 
discounting on the comparison of alternative social security systems, and find that intergenerational 
transfers within a pay-as-you-go economy are usually secured by the social security system and 
independent of longevity, whereas this is not the case for the funded economy.
Previous studies of pension systems focus on the effects of pension system on the wealth 
accumulation and consumption after retirement, not including policy target. In these previous 
studies, social security system did not act initiatively. However, the pension system in this paper 
aims to modify the behavior of hyperbolic discounters’ which is considered as irrational in the long 
run. This paper is intended to incorporate social security system as a policy instrument to adjust the 
consumption level and retirement age of hyperbolic discounters. The novelty of this paper includes: 
i) investigating the effects of mandatory pension system on the adjustment of consumption level and 
retirement age of quasi-hyperbolic discounters; ii) ascertain not only the welfare effects but also the 
behavior effects of pension adjustment.
An overlapping-generation model of quasi-hyperbolic discounters with endogenous labor supply 
is employed. A pension system is incorporated to adjust the over-consumption and late-retirement of 
quasi-hyperbolic discounters to the level that is obtained under exponential discounting and regarded 
as optimal in the long-run perspective. 
By applying mandatory pension system to the adjustment of consumption level and retirement age 
of quasi-hyperbolic discounters in a small open economy, it is ascertained that as two policy target 
the consumption level and retirement age cannot be adjusted to the optimal level at the same time. 
For a second-best choice, only several generations’ behavior can be adjusted, while other generation’s 
welfare will be hurt. However, in order to lead to a Pareto Improvement there is path of contribution 
rates along which the welfare of each generation could be increased.
1 Hereafter, the expressions “quasi-hyperbolic discounting” and “hyperbolic discounting” will be referred 
interchangeably.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model. 
Section 3 is devoted to the solutions. Section 4 discusses the adjustment effects of mandatory social 
security system. Section 5 discusses the results got from the foregoing sections. Section 6 makes the 
concluding remarks.
2. The Model
Consider a small open economy populated by overlapping generations of quasi-hyperbolic discounters 
who live for three ages with a population growth rate n. In this economy, the three-period model with 
endogenous retirement decision is employed. Besides, a social security system is incorporated into the 
model economy, in which the generation of individuals who are old enough, that is to say at age 3 of 
the whole life, receive a lump-sum pension benefit b. The time horizon is infinite.
Let’s consider a generation who is born in period t-1 (hereafter generation t-1), and assume the 
population of this generation is unit. Therefore, for the generation who are born at period t-1, at age 
1 they work and contribute to the social security system at some contribution rate ; and at age 2, 
they can choose when to retire with  and contribute to social security system at a certain 
rate ; and at age 3, they retire and receive a lump-sum pension benefit . The contribution rates of 
social security system vary over each period, but stay the same in one period. In each time period, the 
pension benefits of a generation of individuals are collected from the contributions of generation of 
individuals who are at age 1 and working at age 2. Hence for the generation t-1, they receive a lump-
sum pension benefit at period t+1,
  (1)
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997) forms the discounted utility function into
  (2)
where  denotes the present bias parameter and .  denotes the cost of 
working at age 2, including endogenous labor supply (Frogneux, 2009). When present bias βis less 
than 1, the marginal rates of substitution between c2 and c3 in period 1 differs from that in period 2. It 
causes time-inconsistency if this problem is solved forwardly without incorporating the future shifting 
of the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution. 
Assume the consumers to be constant relative risk aversion with the inverse of the elasticity of 
substitution equal to 1, which simplifies the utility function to be in the form of natural logarithm,
 . (3)
Similarly, the cost function of working at age 2 is assumed to be
 . (4)
The budget constraint faced by the consumers is
 , (5)
where  and  are the wage rates of working at each age, and R>1 is the gross interest rate.
Characterized by their strong impatience for future utility, quasi-hyperbolic discounters are verified 
to consumer more than exponential discounters do, and retire later to support themselves after they 
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stop working. It is the present bias that causes the deviation of consumption level and retirement age. 
Social security system is known for its reallocation effect on individual’s consumption and it is of 
great interest to investigate whether the consumption level and retirement age can be adjusted by it.
3. The solutions
Following O'donoghue & Rabin (1999), the sophisticates and the naïfs are considered. The former are 
capable of realizing their self-control problem and incorporating it into the future plan while the later 
are unaware of their present-bias and behave time-inconsistently. However, the set-up of model in the 
foregoing section makes the consumption and labor-supply of both types of individuals coincide, that 
is to say that the naïfs just happen to correctly predict their consumption level and retirement age at 
age 1. Therefore, it is only necessary to consider the sophisticates (or the naïfs).
For the sophisticates, they fully predict the dynamic inconsistency of their own and solve the inter-
temporal utility maximizing problem backwardly.
Let’s consider a generation who are born at period t-1(generation t-1). Since the sophisticates are 
considered, they can incorporate the dynamic inconsistency into plan, and behave according to it. To 
start with planning the optimal consumption level at each age and optimal retirement age, they begin 
with solve the utility maximizing problem at age 2. And assume that social security system covers 




The first order condition at age 2 is
  (9)
  (10)
Similarly, the first order condition at age 1 is obtained by incorporating the first order condition at age 2,
  
  (11)
The first order conditions show that social security system does have effects on consumption through 
the endogenous labor supply.





The generation t-1 chooses when to retire at age 2, which is period t. In the same period, they have 
Mandatory Social Security Regime, Consumption and Retirement Behavior of Quasi-Hyperbolic DiscountersSeptember 2013 － 123 －
to contribute to the social security system at rate of kt. And kt only has effects on the labor supply. 
The consumption level at each age is merely independent of the contribute rate of social security 
at age 1 and 3, those are period t-1 and period t+1. Consistent with intuition, consumption level 
decreases with the contribution rate which is in the period generation t-1 is at age 2, and increases 
with the contribution rate which is in the period generation t-1 is not working. It is noticeable that the 
consumption level at each age is independent of the contribution rate at age 2, even though consumers 
contribute to the social security system at age 2 when they are working.
4. A mandatory social security system
4.1 The adjusted generations
In the social security system, the consumption level and labor supply of generation t-1 are influenced 
by contributing to social security at rate kt-1 and kt in each period and receive a lump-sum pension 
benefit whose amount is independent of the contribution rate in period t+1. And it is obtained that 




Following O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999), the exponential discounters’ consumption level and 
retirement age are considered as the optimal outcome from the long-run perspective, for their 
preference is time consistent. And in this model, these are denoted as “E”,
  (18)
  (19)
It is straightforward that the consumption level and retirement age of quasi-hyperbolic discounters 
without social security system are higher than those of exponential discounters, since . 
These have been demonstrated as over-consumption and late-retirement of quasi-hyperbolic 
discounters.
In this paper, social security system is employed to modify the consumption level and labor supply 
of quasi-hyperbolic discounters, who are verified to over-consume or late-retire, to the level under 
exponential discounting without social security:
  (20)
 and  . (21)
The adjustment effect of social security system for generation t-1 causes
  (22)
  (23)
Consider first-best optimal conditions that the consumption level and labor supply of every 
generation are adjusted. And similarly for generation t, 
  (24)
  (25)
However, the first-best optimal conditions cannot be realized since they contradict to each other. 
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In this context, the consumption level and labor supply of quasi-hyperbolic discounters cannot be 
adjusted to be the same level as exponential discounters for every generation.
Proposition 1 The consumption level and retirement age of all generations cannot be adjusted to the 
optimal levels at the same time.
Consider second-best optimal conditions that social security system adjusts not every generation’s, 
but every other one generation’s consumption level and labor supply, for generation t+1,
  (26)
  (27)
By considering the conditions for generation t-1 and t+1 simultaneously, a dynamic path of 
contribution rate of social security system can be achieved. In this context, the consumption level and 
retirement age of every other generation can be regulated.
Figure 1 to Figure 3 illustrate how contribute rate to social security in each period dynamically 
relates to each other’s. Before moving to the analysis of figures, relative interest ratio  is 
introduced, which is defined as the ratio of gross interest rate to the speed of population growth.
Definition 1 The ratio of gross interest rate to the speed of population growth  is defined as 
relative interest ratio.
Based on the simplified assumptions that the population of generation t-1 is unit and the population 
growth rate is n, these figures illustrate the tendency of the path of contribution rate qualitatively 
rather than quantitatively.
When R>1+n, that is relative interest ratio is larger than 1, shown in Fig. 1, the contribute rate of 
social security grows on a path of divergence. R>1+n implies that the gross interest rate exceeds 
the speed of population growth. And in order to adjust every other generation’s behavior, the 
contribution rate of social security has to grow on a path of divergence. However, there is a steady 
point on which every other generation’s behavior can be adjusted to the optimal level, and when 
, the steady point of contribution rate is between 0 and 1. This is a 
steady state of contribution rate when the population grows sufficiently slow, which implies that in this 
steady state the social security system meets the pension benefit and adjust every other generation’s 
consumption level and retirement age.
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Fig. 1  The contribution rate of pension system: the case of R>1+n
Fig. 2 shows that when R<1+n, i.e. relative interest ratio is less than 1, the contribution rate of social 
security converges. R<1+n implies that the speed of population growth exceeds the gross interest 
rate. When population grows rapidly, benefitting from a large population in working age, the whole 
population doesn’t have a growing burden of pension paid for the retired people. However, the steady 
point to which the contribution rate of social security converges is definitely negative, which implies 
people receive from rather than contribute to the social security system when they are working.
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Fig. 2  The contribution rate of pension system: the case of R<1+n
Fig.3 shows that when R=1+n, i.e. relative interest ratio equals to 1, the contribution rate of social 
security system proportionally decreases and there is no steady point. R=1+n implies that the gross 
interest rate equals to the speed of population growth. In this context, people don’t have a growing 
burden of contribution to social security system either.
Proposition 2 In pension system, in order to adjust the consumption and retirement behavior of some 
generations to the optimal level, the path of contribution rate to this system depends on the relative 
interest rate .
Proposition 2 implies that the path of contribution rate to pension system depends on the 
relationship between the gross interest rate and the speed of population growth, i.e. the relative interest 
rate. Intuitively, in a pension system, the pension benefits of the retired generations are paid by the 
younger working generations. Therefore, it is strongly dependent on the population structure.
4.2 The un-adjusted generations
The behavior of the generations who have been adjusted by the social security system has been 
investigated; however, it is unknown what the behavior of un-adjusted generations is. The 
consumption level and retirement age of the un-adjusted generations are discussed in this sub-section.
Definition 2 The generations whose consumption level and retirement age are adjusted to the optimal 
levels by the mandatory pension system are referred as the adjusted generations; the other generations 
whose behavior is not adjusted are referred as the un-adjusted generations.
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Fig. 3  The contribution rate of pension system: the case of R=1+n
For generation t, whose consumption level and labor supply aren’t adjusted,
  (28)
  (29)
It is has been assumed that every generation incorporates the social security system into the life-
time utility maximizing problem even though their behavior are not adjusted by the system. Therefore, 
the social security system still has indirect effects on the un-adjusted generations. And it is can be 
calculated that how the consumption level and retirement age are affected by the social security 
system by making subtractions.
For the consumption level,
  (30)
  (31)
As the result of subtraction shows, the consumption level of un-adjusted generation t is definitely 
lower than the case without social security system. In this context, the social security system does 
correct the over-consumption of quasi-hyperbolic discounters to some degree even if it does not adjust 
the consumption to the optimal level.
By comparing with the optimal consumption level, it can be found that whether the consumption 
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level is corrected depends on the relationship between gross interest rate and the speed of population 
growth.
When R>1+n, , the generation t still over-consume. However, they still consume less 
than the case without social security system. When R<1+n, , the generation t under-
consume. The social security system over-corrects the consumption level and results in that it is under 
the proper limit. When R=1+n, , the generation t consume at an appropriate level. In this 
case, the consumption of un-adjusted generation is corrected to the optimal level even though the 
social security level does not intend to do so.
Proposition 3 For the un-adjusted generations, they always consume less than the case without social 
security system; and when relative interest ratio  > (<) 1, they consume more (less) than the 
optimal level.
For the retirement age,
  (32)
  (33)
The results of subtractions show that the correction extent of un-adjusted generation’s behavior 
depends on the relationship between gross interest rate and the speed of population growth, as well as 
the present bias parameter β and long-run discounter factor δ.
Compared with the case without social security system, when R=1+n it distinguishes between that 
generation t within social security system retire earlier or later than those without it. And R=1+n 
implies that social security system has no effects on the retirement age of quasi-hyperbolic discounters 
within it, since they work for the same time as those without the system.
The comparison of retirement age between generation t within social security system and 
exponential discounters implies that whether  distinguishes 
that whether generation t retire later than the exponential discounters do or not.
Proposition 4 For the un-adjusted generations, when > (<) , 
they retire later (earlier) than the optimal level; when > (<) 1, they retire later (earlier) than 
the case without social security system.
5. Discussions
5.1 The adjustment effects
Thus far the conditions distinguishing how social security system corrects quasi-hyperbolic 
discounters’ consumption level and retirement age has been demonstrated separately. And a 
comprehensive analysis is made in this section.
As it has been shown, the behavior of generation t-i (i = (2k+1), k=0, 1, 2...) it adjusted to the 
optimal level by the social security system. However, the extent to which the behavior of generation 
t-i (i= 2k, k=0, 1, 2...) is corrected depends on several conditions. The conditions are divided 
into 3 regions by the relationship of the gross interest rate and the speed of population growth. 
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When R>1+n, the contribution rate of social security system grows on a divergence path. And in 
this context, the un-adjusted generations still consume more than the optimal level even though 
their consumption is corrected by the pension system to a lower level. Meanwhile, they have 
to retire later than both the optimal level and those without the pension system. In the region of 
, where the contribution rate converges, the un-adjusted 
generation t-i (i= 2k, k=0, 1, 2...) consume even less than the optimal level. And at the same 
time, they retire later than the optimal level but earlier than those without pension system. When 
, the un-adjusted generation t-i (i= 2k, k=0, 1, 2...) still 
consumer at a low level, and in the mean time they retire earlier than both the optimal level and those 
without the pension system.
Let’s notice 2 critical points where R=1+n and . When 
R=1+n, the gross interest rate coincides with the speed of population growth, and the un-adjusted 
generations consume at the optimal level. However, they retire later than the optimal level and the 
pension system has no effect on retirement age. When , the 
un-adjusted generations consume at a lower level than the optimal one, but retirement age is at the 
optimal level. And in this context, they retire earlier than those without social security system. To 
conclude, the consumption level and retirement age cannot be corrected to the optimal level at the 
same time. The policy makers have to confront with a tradeoff between the optimal consumption level 
and the optimal labor supply.
The critical value which distinguishes whether the un-adjusted generations retire at the optimal 
age deals with the time preference parameters: the long-run discount factor δ and the present bias 
parameter β. A smaller β which implies stronger present bias increases the region where the un-
adjusted generations get retired earlier than the optimal level. In this context, the time preference 
parameters do not only have effects on determining the labor supply level but also on the degree of the 
un-adjusted generations’ retirement age being corrected.
5.2 The welfare effects
This sub-section discusses welfare consequences of each generation after the mandatory contribution 
rate of social security system. From a long-run perspective, variations on life discounted utility 
after compulsory pension contribution rate regime are investigated. The behavior of exponential 
discounters is regarded as rational since their time-consistent preferences. And therefore compulsory 
pension contribution regime is designed in the foregoing section to adjust the consumption and 
retirement age to the optimal level which is under exponential discounting. It has been ascertained that 
for some generations consumption and retirement age can be adjusted to the optimal level while for 
other generations the optimal adjustment cannot be realized at the same time. And it is of interest to 
investigate what effects does the compulsory pension contribution regime have on each generation’s 
welfare.
Following O'Donoghue & Rabin (2006), ax-ante welfare with exponential discounting is evaluated. 
Welfare is considered to be discounted utility from one’s point of view that is at the beginning of each 
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generation in a long-run perspective. For example, the welfare of generation t is defined as
  (34)
By making subtraction, let’s compare welfare level between quasi-hyperbolic discounters within 
mandatory pension contribution regime and those without it.
For generations whose behavior is adjusted to the optimal level, say generation t-i (i = (2k+1), 
k=0, 1, 2...), the welfare difference is
  (i = (2k+1), k=0, 1, 2...). (35)
And it is provable that , . This welfare improvement straightforwardly 
holds since the optimal consumption level and retirement age are considered to be those under 
exponential discounting which is represents the long-run perspective,
For generations whose behavior is not adjusted to the optimal level, i.e. generation t-i (i= 2k, k=0, 1, 
2...), the welfare difference is
  
 (i= 2k, k=0, 1, 2...),
 (36)
which is definitely negative. This implies that the mandatory pension contribution regime cause 
welfare deterioration to the un-adjusted generations.
Proposition 5 After employing the mandatory pension system, the welfare of the adjusted generations 
is improved; however, the welfare of the un-adjusted generations is deteriorated.
So far it has been ascertained that under mandatory pension contribution regime proposed by 
this paper for some generations the consumption and retirement age can be adjusted to the optimal 
level while other generations have to suffer from welfare deterioration caused by this regime even 
though their behavior is adjusted to some extent. In the behavioral context, the policy maker has to 
confront with a tradeoff between the optimal consumption level and the optimal labor supply. And in 
the welfare context, the policy maker has to consider the fairness – which generations’ welfare to be 
sacrificed.
However, it is still available to find out a mandatory pension regime to raise the welfare level of 
each generation. Consider a certain generation  of hyperbolic discounters, pension system causes 
Pareto improvement of welfare implies
  (37)
A sufficient but not necessary condition of this improvement is
  (38)
 and  (39)
which imply that
  (40)
 and   (41)
This sufficient but not necessary condition implies that in order to cause Pareto improvement the 
contribution rate of pension should at least keep proportionally to ratio of gross interest rate over 
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population growth rate, which is referred as relative interest ratio.
When the relative interest ratio  is larger than 1, which implies that the gross interest 
rate is higher than the population growth speed, the population grows at a relatively slow rate. In 
this context, the boundary condition of leading a Pareto improvement on contribution rate to pension 
system converging. While on the other hand, when the relative interest ratio is less than 1, the 
boundary condition is diverging. They both depend on the relative interest ratio.
6. Conclusions
This paper proposes a mandatory social security contribution regime in order to adjust the 
consumption and retirement age of quasi-hyperbolic discounters to the optimal level in the long-
run perspective which is under exponential discounting. Within this mandatory pension contribution 
regime, this paper ascertains that behavior of all generations cannot be adjusted to the optimal levels 
at the same time. With behavior adjusted to the optimal level, the adjusted generations’ welfare is 
improved. However, the un-adjusted generations’ welfare is deteriorated.
There are some points of this paper that need to be further developed. This model is based on the 
specific set up of a small open economy in which the gross interest rate is exogenously given. What is 
more, by incorporating the mandatory pension system, the adjusted and un-adjusted generations are 
separated. With different welfare conditions, the fairness is out of the consideration of this paper. 
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